Growing Tension Between Old And New Forces

An open polity is open to the flow of change. It is receptive to internal and external stimuli and adjusts to their pressures to keep its stability unharmed. One condition for political stability is the ability of the polity to fairly balance inputs and outputs. It is vital to control entropy and enhance resilience. Each major political movement of Nepal has stoked the democratic aspiration of Nepalis for freedom, justice and a better life. It resulted in the change of the existing constitution and government, ended in a compromise and accommodated the aspiring elites into governmental power. But in no way was it revolutionary to break ties with the old political classes, shape a new political culture and improve people’s life-prospects.

Noteworthy tension exists in Nepal between the old and new political classes; the latter’s technological efficacy amounts to some discontinuities in cognition, values and attitudes. The change in demographics, education, finance, technology and leadership is creating ripe conditions for the change of Nepali politics. Modernisation of agriculture, business, urbanisation, rationality of administration, media and mass political awareness for political participation have evolved preconditions for improving the legitimacy of politics and its adjustment to change. The literature of dissent of the intellectual community has often flashed voices as a critique of the political order so that the regime does not sink into sectarian lines but remains receptive to responsiveness, inclusion and representation of the nation’s social diversity. 

Balance 

The unsettling of these factors has left the political condition often troubling, requiring an anchor for a balance between continuity and change. Three elements make political conditions for change in Nepali politics. First, steady dislocation of old parties and the shifting pattern of loyalties of the people driven more by information and communication than history, culture,  tradition and ideology. Migration, education, communication, occupational shifts, commercialisation and social mobility added new elements into the change process. Second, Western education, ideologies, business practices, admin, management and associational movements have undervalued the indigenous knowledge and tradition, deeming the latter unscientific and less useful for teaching, inquiry, policy formulation and social change. 

Third, global pressure to adopt many norms and resolutions has made Nepal amenable to new political acculturation of youths. Real change in Nepal, however, does not flow from the social engineering of top leaders, professional experts and technical elites. They have only created space for the bloated size of elites and bureaucracy struggling for privileges inverse to the belief of modernisation theorists but by the conscious participation of people from below. Stabilisation of change demands building institutions, values and procedures that sustain the physical and economic security of people. Structurally entrenched interests habitually prefer the status quo and lend their support to matching policies. This does not threaten their wealth and power by the catalysts of change agents seeking freedom, entitlements and opportunities. 

A perceptual gap exists between Nepali leaders and scholars, as the former believe that people join the international labour market by choice to see the external world, not by their wretched condition of living at home. The awakened social conscience of scholars, however, perceives this situation differently. They expose leaders' unproven beliefs and criticize their migration and citizenship policies. They equally favour a productive and embedded economy which can create jobs for people within the nation, enabling them to exercise their sovereign power in all vital aspects of national life, not just remittance collectors. 

Ironically the stream of countless regime change and mercurial style of politics without its positive effects on desirable governance hints the present as carry-over of the past, not the imagination of a better future whose hope seems hazy. The continuity of the traits of the ancien regime marks the spectacle of feudalism and aristocracy against the lower classes of people aspiring to create political conditions for responsive politics. Many Nepali political parties have internalised these traits and, therefore, often sense a fear of the outcome of the egalitarian impulse of the constitution. The demand for inner party democracy and democratisation of leaders add stamina to the struggle of Nepali youth for intergenerational justice. 

It entails the sharing of political power by each class and generation of people and reciprocity as per their numerical strength.  Senior leaders are torn between the legacy of ideology and human psychology that fosters pragmatism in power lust. This pragmatism has created a paradox between the national heritage of freedom and the modern aspiration of secularisation and materialisation of political life in spite of deep dependency and corresponding loss of policy sovereignty. Those indulged in revolutionary adventure seek a break from the pattern of internal and external relations of the nation based on the dependency model of development, for a more indigenous one, as the former pushes Nepalis to marginalisation, causing political uprising against the condition of living. 

While the new leaders and elites are acculturated in technological dreams lack reflective awareness and refuse to indigenise public policies to fit native reality. The other factor is adaptation of its constitutional and political structures and roles to the dynamic forces of society — critical mass, civil society, people’s activism, mass media, economy and technology. The rise of cult figures in Nepali politics has made them a contested site. It affronted popular sovereignty and the divinity of people, Janata Janardan and incited contradictions, factions, cracks, alienation and apathy within the leadership structures. 

It is vital to keep a balance between the pluralist models of the Nepali state’s imperative of security, rule of law, public order and opposition forces, acting as counterbalancers of power demanding legitimate space, recognition and justice.  The constitution has given every Nepali equal political rights but the income gap prevents them to realise these rights. The imbalance between the property rights of people and the distributional social struggle has created conditions ripe for a change in politics. Political parties of Nepal have become powerful enough to control the former governance but failed to make them responsive to public goods. The de-ideologisation of political leaders has made their solidarity and justification void to serve the interests of various classes and eroded their power of collective action. 

Now ideologies of Nepali parties are no longer regarded as instruments of change. The nation has tested all ideologies and their efficacy to project a human face remains cloudy. They no longer serve policy alternatives for desirable change.  The winner-takes-all version of politics has created more losers of power and inflamed their restlessness for political change. Each election has socialised people with amazing expectations and resulting frustration, thus making political conditions amenable to stir, change and transformation. When the polity cannot maintain its internal vision with the zeitgeist, the external stimuli exert pressure for change to conform to its values, principle and rules.

 Nepal’s polity has habitually faced pressure to adopt democracy, human rights, market economy, educational, health and administrative reforms and sectoral rights to women, Dalits, indigenous people, minorities, labour and professional groups. These elements and their social energy have propelled the Nepali polity and constitution to eternal change. People engage in revolt for change if they find a gap between their constitutional ideals and the practice of leadership culture. The Nepali constitution is a vital document to bring all forces into national coherence. But when powerful actors do not follow its rules, politics prepares ground to organise people into alternative parties and associations, mobilise the victims of society and catalyze them into action for political change. 

Now Nepali leaders of all hues are caught in a blind alley and forced to steer politics without the ideology they were indoctrinated with for long. Social movements also run too far beyond the ability of social scientists to conceptualize and use their insight for adaptation to change. Human instinct and economy have consumed the efficacy of ideology in political life. While Nepali corporate media treat politics as a stage for entertainment, old leaders are vulnerable to its choreographed messages, advertisement and manipulation of public opinion. New forces, however, feel that they provide an opportunity for personality projection and competitive leverage in the power struggle with their counterparts. 

This entertaining politics exonerates Nepali leaders from public policy responsibility and disconnects them from the aspiration for change in the style of governance that is honest, transparent and accountable. Social media, by contrast, constantly nurses people’s interests, controls political narratives and instantly provides various incentives for their users to unlearn the deeds of old leaders and shape counter public opinion. This media has made big advances toward inclusiveness with the ubiquity of mobiles and exposing Nepalis to the world of critical politics, thus eroding authority structures.

Personalised politics

Change in information technology is attuned to the value of personalised politics. It has eased horizontal networking across young generations of people and challenged old parties built on hierarchy, patriarchy and leader-oriented inflexible structures. New technologies are exposing the illusion of engineering democracy and prosperity benefitting people and inflaming their passion for new modernity, identity and opportunity for good governance. It requires systemic change in the structure and political culture to cope with the myriad of longstanding challenges Nepal is facing.  

Will there be a meaningful policy change when the old political classes and new forces have the same social vision of migration, economic policy of neoliberalism and political pragmatism? Will there be a change in institutional culture that can make public institutions autonomous of dominant interest groups and agents of the deep state so that public policy adopted by the state remains appropriate and functional, thus serving public goods? It is obviously something that cannot be answered in advance. Serious political inquiry is essential.

((Former Reader at the Department of Political Science, TU, Dahal writes on political and social issues.)