Nepal And Revolving New World Order

Ultimately, even the most dominant and carefully managed world order reaches a point of transition. History shows us that even the strongest empires have fallen. What we call “world order” is, at its core, a hierarchy of strength as Thucydides observed long ago, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” For countries like Nepal, caught between giants and global players having strategic interests, these power shifts are not abstract theories; they shape domestic politics, foreign policy choices, and the very space for independent decision-making. 

The balance of power in South Asia has not been free from its effects, nor has Nepal. The United States, China, and India are the key players in the region. Each has its own goals for security, influence, and development, and together they are redrawing the map of regional politics. India’s aspiration for greater global stature, China’s revisionist challenge to U.S. primacy, and Washington seeking to sustain dominance while maneuvering between the elephant’s chest and the dragon’s belly have altered the geopolitical paradigm in the region.

U.S.-China relationship 

Since 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was unified by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under the leadership of Chairman Mao, Washington primarily viewed Beijing through the lens of Cold War rivalry. Washington’s early policy was one of containment, fearing the spread of communism across Asia. 

The balance shifted in the 1970s when Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing opened the door, which turned former and future adversaries into cautious partners. Washington saw China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and this pragmatic turn laid the foundation for decades of cooperation. China’s economic reforms after 1978 transformed it into a global powerhouse, often described in the West as an economic miracle, though for the Chinese it was the result of persistent hard work and discipline. 

The year 2008 marked a turning point when the paths began to diverge. What had once been framed as engagement slowly shifted into suspicion, as the global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities and China’s growing confidence unsettled the West. The subsequent years saw China deepen its role in alternative groupings like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), signalling its ambition to reshape global institutions. That drift widened under the Biden administration, when chip export controls and tariff measures drew a clear line between cooperation and competition. 

At the same time, Washington pushed the Indo‑Pacific strategy, bringing together partners across Asia to make sure China’s growing influence did not go unchecked. India has become the key player in this plan, as the broader goal is to roll back, or at least contain, China’s rise. Today, the relationship has reached a point where both sides see little room for return.

India’s long‑standing ties with Russia have been a cornerstone of its foreign policy, rooted in defence cooperation and shared strategic interests. In contrast, Washington historically leaned toward Pakistan, seeing it as a reliable partner during the Cold War. U.S. officials at the time, including President Lyndon B. Johnson’s circle, openly justified this choice, arguing that “strong Pakistani men” would be more effective allies than what they described as “weak Hindus.” This reflected the racialised and strategic thinking of that era.

The 1962 Sino‑Indian war was a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. India’s vulnerability against a Chinese attack prompted the Kennedy administration to extend military and logistical support, including airlifted supplies and training assistance. This opened the door to a cautious alignment, as both sides shared concern about Beijing’s rise. Still, India stayed close to Moscow and held on to non‑alignment. After the Cold War, the world moved into a U.S.-led unipolar order, where India and Washington found greater alignment on South Asian issues. In this period, American policy toward Nepal was often shaped by India’s influence.

Multipolar world

Today, the landscape has shifted into a multipolar world. India is striving to be a global power in its own right, but it has chosen strategic autonomy as the principle guiding its foreign policy. This has created friction with Washington, most visibly over India’s purchases of discounted Russian oil and its continued engagement with BRICS, alongside debates over how far New Delhi will align with U.S. containment aims toward China. American rhetoric has also heightened sensitivities around Kashmir and Ladakh. India’s defence establishment warns of fifth-generation warfare, where destabilization occurs through information and psychological means rather than conventional arms. These risks are particularly acute near the “Chicken’s Neck”, where instability could threaten India’s national security. 

The same tension is visible in fragile democracies like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, where U.S. involvement is often viewed as interference. Washington’s strategic interest in places such as Diego Garcia shows how military presence and political influence are closely linked. In Bangladesh, for instance, when Sheikh Hasina resisted certain U.S. pressures, her eventual removal was seen by many as a warning of what happens when leaders push back.

This pattern of pressure and presence becomes even clearer when examining the timing of U.S. diplomatic visits. It is difficult to overlook that Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu’s trips to the region appear closely aligned with moments of political upheaval. He was in Bangladesh in May, just three months before Sheikh Hasina’s departure; in Nepal in December, shortly after the signing of the Belt and Road Initiative and earlier in Pakistan before Imran Khan’s removal, where leaked cables quoted Lu warning that Khan’s position on Russia would bring “consequences.” Taken together, these episodes reinforce the perception that Washington is not only exerting diplomatic pressure but also combining it with military positioning to influence the political trajectory of South Asian states.

The evolving geopolitics of South Asia can be conceptualised as a triangular dynamic in which the coordinated actions of any two major powers substantially constrain the strategic options available to the third. China and India, despite rivalry, increasingly find tactical and issue-specific common ground to resist expanding external influence, and Washington’s growing military and diplomatic footprint in the region further narrows the scope for independent maneuvering. This situation has become a necessity for both Beijing and New Delhi, as limited cooperation allows them to safeguard regional autonomy and counterbalance external pressures.

Lessons for Nepal

These transformations in great‑power behaviour are not distant or abstract for Nepal; rather, they generate concrete pressures that reverberate through domestic political processes, shape foreign‑policy decision making, and limit the scope for independent strategic choice. For Nepal, the immediate imperative is to convert strategic sensitivity into strategic strength. This demands firm devotion to democratic resilience, transparent governance, and diversified partnerships such that Kathmandu is not configured as a theatre of proxy competition. 

Practically, this means maintaining good and friendly relations with India and China, deepening ties with other regional partners, investing in inclusive development at home, and using multilateral forums to amplify Nepal’s voice. Ultimately, the changing world order demands clarity and confidence: Nepal’s best defence is not choosing sides but asserting its national interest through diplomacy and nonalignment. By anchoring policy in sovereignty, stability, and development, Nepal can navigate the triangle of great‑power competition demonstrating that smaller states are actors, not afterthoughts.

 (Adhikari is Founding President of Centre for Democracy and Civil Studies (CDCS)