Yet Another Shinawatra In Power

Two prime ministers from a family might be judged a chance but four would be more than just a coincidence — a pattern that holds a record in electoral democracy. Paetongtarn, 37, is latest Shinawatra to don the prime ministerial hat and enable the most prominent political clan to bounce back to power. Pheu Thai party picked her as its candidate for the top job on August 16 that became vacant after the Constitutional Court sacked Srettha Thavisin for inducting in his cabinet a member having already been convicted in serious charges. Thai law bars such inclusion. In office for barely a year, Thavisin is the third prime minister to be ruled out of office by the Constitutional Court.

Paetongtarn is confident that her party and “coalition parties will lead our country in helping with Thailand's economic crisis”. The team includes pro-military groups that were associated with the 2014 army coup. Paetongtarn’s father, Thaksin, 75, ended his 15-year exile when he returned home last year, on the very day Srettha was sworn into office. Thaksin in 2006 and his sister Yingluck in 2014 were both ousted in military coups. Considering that the army was for long against him, the former premier’s return home was widely seen as an understanding reached with pro-military force that feared the growing presence of a relatively new Move Forward Party (MFP). 

Numbers game

Although the MFP won the largest percentage of popular votes and single-largest number of seats in the 2023 election, it was not able to form a government. Thaksin’s return was apparently a result of a backdoor understanding with the army that saw a “threat” from the relatively new MFP, which won the popular vote in last year’s election. MFP was blocked from forming a government when the army-nominated senate went against it. The military is suspicious of going against the country’s long-established cultural and royal legacies. It calculates that Thaksin’s party is more acceptable than the new party that advocated “radical” constitutional changes. 

While the wealthy Shinawatra family enjoys considerable support of mass voters, Thaksin as the patriarch continues to wield influence both on the party rank and file as well as on large sections of the population, particularly in rural areas. MFP wanted to reform the existing law covering monarchy in a country where a slightest hint of criticism of the royal institution invites severe punishment, including imprisonment for up to 15 years. Its call for change rubbed a sensitive nerve, which proved to be the prime cause for its being left high and dry in the power game. MFP had inspired youths in their hundreds of thousands to demonstrate for weeks in the streets, pressing for monarchy’s reform. The 2023 elections were the first since the military took over in 2014. 

Initial reaction to the military move was welcomed by many people who were disenchanted with political leaders who for years failed to deliver the services they pledged during elections. The people were disappointed with the politicians. The US and its close allies made subdued remarks on the military coup because of their strategic interests that took precedence over democratic principles which they on convenient occasions swear by. Thailand’s ties with the US are marked by American military bases on its soil, Washington is reticent in criticising its long-time ally for authoritarian conditions. 

Selective stands on various issues erode a nation’s international credibility, especially when a big power instigates a military coup against a duly elected democratic government. There are numerous instances of regime changes and toppling of governments at the behest of powerful foreign forces that zealously nurse their own individual “national interests” whatever the means and methods the move might have entailed. These underscore the duplicity in practice, rendering the chanting of lofty ideals of fair and transparent deal to sound hollow, especially to those actually bearing the malpractice on them.  

In Thailand, which experienced 14 successful coups, there were fears that some kind of judicial coup might greet the new elected government last year. The speculation proved wrong. Thavisin had to step down for not having duly vetted one of his cabinet ministers, and the stringent law in this connection took its course, paving way for a fourth Shinawatra to head a new government. During the Vietnam War in the 1960s until the mid-1970s, the US deployed combat aircraft, and it continues to operate several military bases in that country. The 2010s and after are witness to heightened rivalry with China and Russia. At the same time, Sino-Russian ties have received a big boost at different levels and in multiple sectors. Faced with stiff sanctions from the US and its allies in Europe and elsewhere, Moscow finds Beijing as an increasingly reliable partner in cooperation in a world of three superpowers.

Big power interests

Beijing sees Washington’s drive for expanding and strengthening Indo-Pacific Strategy as inherently aimed against it. Indeed, China offers serious competition to the US in space technology, artificial intelligence, hypersonic technology and massive infrastructure development, which are taking place at a breathtaking scale and speed. South-East Asia constitutes a very important region for all big powers. Whereas Beijing and Moscow consider the region their neighbourhood, the far-off Europe and the US are keen on maintaining a strong presence in the area in terms of military influence and economic clout. 

And the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), representing 600 million people, wields considerable economic clout and, with it, in other spheres as well. China claims sovereignty over much of South China Sea, which is estimated to possess 11 billion barrels of oil and a vast array of other natural resources, including staggering reserves of natural gas. Several other countries dispute Beijing’s assertion and stake their own claims. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam deny China’s exclusive claim. Many islands and coral reefs are sources of the dispute. 

The Philippines, the most vociferous among them, is supported by the US-led West. Located close by, Thailand attracts keen interest and close scrutiny from big powers, apart for its own market — existing as well as potential. Paetongtarn’s two immediate tasks are to shore up the economy and pursue a foreign policy that serves the country’s vital interests in keeping with an inevitable changing world order.

(Professor Kharel specialises in political communication.)