In Quest Of Strategic Advantage

As Russian invasion of Ukraine drags on, threatening statement of Russia’s President Putin signaling the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons has rung alarming bell to the international community. Such pronouncement from a nuclear weapons capable country deserves to be taken seriously. The threat of use of nuclear weapons has been a taboo since 1945. But the speech from the top leadership of a country, whose military doctrine has entertained the deployment of relatively low-yield nuclear weapons in a war, can hardly be ignored.

The use of nuclear weapons can be horrendously destructive. The destructiveness of such weapons can be judged from the fact that even low-yield nuclear weapon can mean a detonation equivalent to 5,000 or 10,000 tons of TNT.  Observers have contended that President Putin is making the nuclear threat for several reasons. One of them is the Russian defeat in the war. It was routed out of Kyiv. Its forces were driven from Kharkiv oblast and its defenses mounted by ill-equipped, demoralised and badly trained are being brushed by Ukrainian forces.

Against this background, many have urged for negotiations to end the war. They include John Kerry, a former US Secretary of State during Obama administration and Pope Francis. They do not trouble to think hard about what lies behind the well-orchestrated pronouncement from Moscow. Russia has ambivalence about the West-resentment and fear of it, a sum of inferiority toward it. This also induces it to try to invoke the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear blackmail

Yielding to such nuclear blackmail would be folly. If the international community does not resist under these circumstances, it may give a very wrong message by luring nuclear weapons possessors to learn that the secret to success in a negotiation is to froth at the mouth, roll up one’s eyes, and threaten the mushroom cloud.

Diplomacy has certainly got a role to play here. That diplomatic option consists rather in reminding key Russian leaders that Moscow should use nuclear weapons, it will provoke many in its neighbourhood to vie for them. They would justify the acquisition in the name of self-defense. A wave for the nuclear weapons will most likely to be seen in Poland, Turkey, Kazakhstan and many other countries who feel threatened by the possible use of nuclear weapons.

Once a nuclear taboo is broken, its spillover effects will not be confined to the periphery of Russia. Countries like Japan and South Korea may feel that they need the security of their own nuclear deterrents despite being protected by US nuclear umbrella due to military alliance.

In this context, both China and India, being nuclear-armed and enjoying leverage to engage Moscow diplomatically, have a stake. India, facing Pakistan that may have more nuclear weapons than it does, and whose politics is terrifyingly unstable should have no interest in seeing nuclear use become acceptable. All other countries that can still talk to Moscow should take the initiative to convey the message to Russia’s leadership that resort to nuclear weapons will not make Russia any safer or stronger.

President Putin’s declaration in February is a clear example of his nuclear sabre-rattling when he said, “Whoever tries to impede us, let alone create threats for our country and its people, must know that the Russian response will be immediate and lead to the consequences you have never seen in history”. Analysts observe that Russians might set off one or a few tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, if the war were to turn decisively in favour of Ukraine, or by triggering a symbolic explosion over an empty area.

The question of nuclear escalation was at the centre of strategic debate during Cold War, a period characterised by tense relationship between the US and Soviet Union. Illustratively, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it appeared that the US and Soviet Union were on the brink of nuclear war. To every one’s relief, nuclear disaster was averted when American President Kennedy struck bargain with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to remove US missiles from Turkey reciprocating the Soviet leader’s decision to withdraw Russian missiles from Cuba.

The nuclear alarm was raised by President Joe Biden recently when he said, “The world may be facing the prospect of Armageddon if President Putin uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine”. But whether there might be an analogous understanding between the American and the Russian leadership to avoid the worst outcome coming from nuclear weapons use is not clear. The situation looks gloomy considering President Putin’s latest threats. He declared that the US decision to drop atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 set a precedent and that, if necessary, he would follow suit.

Diplomatic efforts

The threat is serious because many believe that President Putin is not likely to stop invoking the power of his nuclear arsenal as long as his ground troops are struggling. Historically, states escalate not because of who they happen to be facing on the battlefield but because they are failing to achieve their war aims and may even be facing the possibility of a major defeat. When a country is losing — or not winning as quickly as it wants – it is likely to consider other options no matter who happens to be pulling the triggers on the other side.

Moreover, some commentators opine that the absence of US troops in Ukraine might make escalation more attractive to Russian leaders. It might make nuclear use less risky in view of the fact that the US soldiers would not be killed. Putin has repeatedly raised the spectre of the use of nuclear weapons as his military faces significant battlefield setbacks during its war in Ukraine. Moscow’s current approach to nuclear brinkmanship may be guided by its quest for strategic advantage. As the use of nuclear weapons runs apocalyptic risks, the diplomatic efforts to end the Ukraine war should be hastened without further delay.

(Thapa was Foreign Relations Advisor to the Prime Minister 2008-09.)