Europe Mulls New Security Deal

Europe has woken up to a new geopolitical and strategic reality. A flurry of diplomatic activities and tactical manoeuvres have been mounted by the European leaders to strengthen Europe’s security through a concerted approach.  British Prime Minister Keir Starmer recently hosted more than a dozen European leaders at Lancaster House in London to discuss security issues and to build a “coalition of the willing” to support Ukraine. Though the London summit of the European leaders had been planned, it gained much greater geopolitical significance in the wake of the Oval Office meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which had ended on a sour note. 

For British Prime Minister Starmer, the summit served some crucial purposes, which include showing European solidarity and support for Ukraine and re-establishing the United Kingdom’s role as a major player in Europe’s strategic conversation. German chancellor Friedrich Merz has also announced the commitment to overhaul German spending rules on defence. Likewise, French President Emmanuel Macron gave an impassioned national address on Europe’s security needs, which was followed by a special meeting of the European Council in Brussels. European leaders in Brussels demonstrated that they are stepping up—not just with words, but with concrete proposals to act. 

Diplomatic initiative

Starmer and Macron, with their proposal for a European force, have seized the diplomatic initiative. This, according to their proposal, would make Europe an actor with agency. However, the Atlantic Council experts argue that discussing the defence of Ukraine without the Baltic States—which, along with Denmark, does not make sense at the current moment. They represent the top four countries in terms of government support to Ukraine as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP).  The Baltic States are also Europe’s most exposed frontline states. They would be the first ones to defend Europe from Russia, thus making them a crucial part of any considerations on European defence. 

Involving the eastern-flank countries in such discussions is crucial for deterring Russia. Of course, Europe is awakening, but it still needs to take strategically inclusive and comprehensive moves. In this context, the role of Germany is also very important.  The effectiveness of Germany’s role will depend on whether Merz and his future government can follow through on their bold proposals. Devising and implementing an effective defence and defence industrial strategy at home in coordination with European partners is also a big challenge for Herz. Fiscal conservatism is deeply ingrained in German political and governance approach. Merz himself had campaigned on it and vowed to pursue it during the polls. 

But he has now put forth proposals to allow for an increase in defence spending, which is good news for the continent’s ability to respond to geopolitical challenges. But to what extent he would be able to fulfil the commitment is difficult to ascertain at present due to internal constraints. In the same vein, Macron has sought to outline and justify his answers to “a new era” of global uncertainty in his recent address to the nation. The French president carefully explained why Ukraine was instrumental to France’s and Europe’s security. Macron clarified that France would not accept any “abandonment of Ukraine” amid “declining American support” and uncertainty. Perhaps most important was Macron’s statement that the “future of Europe cannot be settled in Washington or Moscow.” The speech painted France’s long-standing aims of being the driving force of a more sovereign Europe, one that would emerge in a stronger position against its adversaries. At the same time, the French president sought to redefine the contours of a new transatlantic relationship. 

Finally, Macron also recalled France’s “particular status” as a nuclear power while further underlining the European dimension of French vital interests. That statement reflects the critical nature of national and European security interests. Macron’s speech is a call for the need for deeper discussions among France and other European nations. France and the United Kingdom are the only states in Europe possessing nuclear weapons, which they currently use solely for national deterrence. Other European NATO allies rely on the United States’ nuclear umbrella through NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. Moreover, with the United States challenging its European allies with its increasingly transactional foreign and security policy, calls for a stronger European role in defence—including nuclear deterrence—are growing louder. 

Rearming Europe

The EU is stepping up through the Rearming Europe initiative, which is an important step in providing member states with greater fiscal space for defence spending. What the EU truly needs is a genuine European initiative that includes financing, stronger coordination, and a coherent defence policy. One of the most glaring inefficiencies in European defence remains the lack of coordination and interoperability among the nations. It is astonishing, according to experts, that different types of ammunition are being used for the same weapons systems, rendering them incompatible. This fragmentation weakens Europe’s ability to respond effectively to security threats and underscores the urgent need for standardisation and enhanced coordination and cooperation. 

Moreover, this is a watershed moment for the U.S.-European partnership. Not only does the relationship need to be rebuilt under a fundamentally new contract, but it must also be completely rethought. Europeans are proving this week that they have the tools necessary to step up to the plate, support themselves, and support Ukraine. Europe should certainly expect a reorientation by the Trump administration, especially regarding security. Hopefully, the steps taken by the EU over the past week will encourage the United States to remain committed to the health of the US-European partnership. The United States should want a stronger and more capable ally that could share the burden of the European security. 

(The author is presently associated with Policy Research Institute (PRI) as a senior research fellow.  rijalmukti@gmail.com)