By Qin Ruijing, Fu Bingfeng, Chen Feiyu and Shunshi Huang

Unlike other candidates, Rodrigo Duterte showed considerable patience during the Philippine presidential campaign. From the beginning, he declared that he would never participate in the election, and then gradually became involved in the election, until he completely mastered the initiative. Duterte is a Philippine president with a new mission. During the election, he played the card of “Davao City Governance”. Based on domestic politics, Duterte is particularly concerned about outstanding social issues. He also did not forget to pay attention to economic activities, which is reflected in his promotion of tax reform, improvement of business environment and infrastructure construction, and optimization of land management system. These measures have successfully focused the attention of various circles on domestic issues, and also dispersed the attention of Filipino people, the Philippine political circles and foreign forces away from its diplomatic ideas. In response to Duterte’s foreign policy and the South China Sea remarks, the United States, Japan, and some Philippine media have issued articles expressing concern about their “uncertainty” and “ambiguity”.   

Duterte’s appeal for internal independence is a major motivation for his new diplomatic strategy. On September 5, 2016, the day before Duterte was preparing to travel to Laos to participate in the ASEAN summit, he said amazingly: “The Philippines is not a vassal state. We have been treated as the American colonies for a long time”. Duterte even publicly attacked former U.S. President Barack Obama, which is unheard of in the history of US-Philippine diplomacy. After that, Obama cancelled the meeting he planned to meet with President Duterte during the ASEAN summit.

Duterte’s diplomatic behavior may seem crazy, but in fact he has considerable political wisdom, which fully reflects his quality as a pragmatic president. First of all, Duterte adopted an “ambiguity” attitude towards the situation in the South China Sea during the election and diverted attention from all walks of life. In fact, it means quite a “slow plan”. Second, Duterte has long been dissatisfied with the current status of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. However, as an important force influencing Philippine politics, if Duterte fights against it prematurely, it will undoubtedly throw straw against the wind. Therefore, he chose to show his attitude only after being in power for two months. Once again, Duterte’s time for this statement is also intriguing. His remarks were made the day before the ASEAN summit, and one of the topics discussed at the ASEAN summit was the South China Sea issue. The Obama administration also previously referred to the Philippine government, hoping to discuss the South China Sea issue with Duterte at the Lao ASEAN summit. Duterte rejected Obama in a seemingly absurd way, but cleverly avoided the South China Sea issue. Finally, Duterte not only avoided discussions with the United States on the South China Sea issue, but also released a political signal to the international community: The U.S.-Philippines alliance is not absolutely strong, and there is possibility of cooperation between China and the Philippines. This also laid the groundwork for the overall improvement of China-Philippine relations afterwards.

 “The situation in the South China Sea is unnecessarily tense”, Premier Li Keqiang said during the ASEAN summit. As he expected, during the ASEAN summit, no country in the South China Sea mentioned the so-called “arbitration case”. Instead, countries outside the region seized the problem. As one of the claiming countries in the South China Sea issue, the Philippines did not stand on the opposite side of China during this period, but instead criticized the United States for “‘intervention in the Philippines’ anti-drug work”, and then specifically thanked “China’s support for its anti-drug work”. The entire speech made no mention of the South China Sea issue, and also fulfilled the statement made by the Philippine President that he had hoped to deal with the South China Sea issue peacefully and properly with China.

Duterte is eager to weaken military ties with the US military. After the ASEAN summit, Duterte said: “I hope that within the next two years, no foreign troops will appear on the territory of the Philippines”. This move first reflects President Duterte’s dissatisfaction—under the severe economic situation in the Philippines and the high poverty rate and lack of infrastructure, the United States had not helped the Philippines, but  repeatedly kidnapped the Philippines on its“Asia-Pacific Rebalancing” chariot.

After Duterte took office, on the one hand, he began to solve domestic political and economic problems, on the one hand, he was committed to adjusting the Philippine diplomatic pattern, and with his resolute style of action, he built a new Philippine diplomatic strategic framework in just a few months. On this basis, the Philippine government has shown a certain degree of centrifugal force against the United States and is actively working to improve relations with China. Sino-Philippine relations quickly entered the honeymoon period. However, with the enrichment of its new diplomatic strategy, the idea of equidistant diplomacy in the Philippine framework gradually became clear. Philippine-US relations are no longer in a rigid state; Philippine-Russia political and military exchanges have increased; Philippine and Japan have further strengthened consensus.

In this context, China will correctly understand Duterte’s new diplomatic strategy and plan out corresponding strategies that are conducive to China’s strategic interests. For China, it is very important to correctly understand the entry point of Philippine equidistance diplomacy, on this basis, fully grasp the initiative of bilateral diplomacy, and promptly promote the deepening of bilateral relations. Through the joint role of politics, economy and culture, China will strengthen the relationship between the two countries.

(Qin Ruijing, Scholar, Yunnan Academy of Social Science, P.R China; Fu Bingfeng, Scholar, Yunnan Academy of Social Science, P.R China; Chen Feiyu, PHD. Scholar of Shanghai International Study University; Shunshi Huang, Scholar of Yunnan University)

Qin Ruijing, Fu Bingfeng, Chen Feiyu and Shunshi Huang