Dr. Upendra Gautam

In one of his thought-provoking essays, Sardaar Yadu Nath Khanal (1913 – 2004), doyen of Nepal’s diplomacy under King Mahendra, has said, “A system of governance does have a red line (Laxman Rekha)”. This system of governance was characterised by autonomous sobriety, maturity and self-discipline based on the five principles peaceful coexistence.
A red line will have two primary sets of players - first is inside the line and, second, outside the line. The insiders of the line shall be defensive, and take up onto itself to go all out defending and protecting the line the system has drawn for itself. Outside of the line will include those hell-bent on interfering, intervening and violating the line in the name of some principles that cover their power interests.

Origin
According to https://en.wikipedia.org/, the usage of term ‘red line” traces back to an “agreement" in 1928 between largest oil companies of Britain, the USA and France at the time of the end of the Ottoman Empire as the borders of the former empire were not clear. To remedy the problem an Armenian businessman Calouste Gulbenkian, took a red pencil to draw in a line to indicate borders of the falling empire. The expression has since been practiced in international diplomacy and was notably reused during the UN's founding after the Second World War.
During the high-level strategic Alaska talks on 18-19th March 2021 between the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA), the Chinese delegation, led by Yang Jiechi, in its response mentioned the “red line” after Blinken said in his opening statement, “We'll also discuss our deep concerns with actions by China, including in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyber attacks on the United States and economic coercion toward our allies…” Saying US was not qualified to "speak from a position of strength," Yang had stressed, the governing status of the CPC and the security of China's socialist system should not be damaged, and that is “a red line” which should never be crossed.
Given the long history and geography of Nepal situated between the PRC and the Republic of India (RoI), and the strategic dialogue discourse in Alaska between PRC and the USA has been a cut in global diplomacy that disciples of diplomat-emeritus Khanal in Nepal must have taken note of to go all out for Nepal’s all-round defensive safeguards. For Nepal, the core strategic instruction to his people by King Prithvi Narayan Shah (1723-1725) has been to go defensive in the face of a warring situation.
Nepal’s experience of secessionist Tibetan activities induced by the Cold War of 1960s and 1970s is enough to provide a substantive lesson to Nepal reinforcing its classic belief in having a red line that though is more of a great intangible precision for its governance system. Sources informed with the strategic practices under King Birendra (1945-2001) informally recall a “Red Box” which contained the materials that inspired and supported Nepal to draw this “red line.” The very red line is Nepal’s resolution of not allowing any force to use its soil against territorial integrity and security of its neighbours. Violation of Nepal’s red line primarily and fundamentally damages Nepal’s sovereign sanctity affecting the neighbours. Perhaps Nepal is the singular country in the world whose red line cares the neighbours as well so well.
Though non-mentioning of Tibet is conspicuous in Blinken’s opening remark, it does not at present seem to make much difference on the USA’s basic view of China. By the same token, Nepal neither can have a sigh of relief by Blinken’s non-mentioning of Tibet which might have been due more to the RoI’s border complexity with China on east-to-west Himalayan mountains. Be what it may, for the US, in the face of its “planned” military pull out from Afghanistan, for all costs and “ideological” reasons, it may be more interested in an integrated proxy war in the western-to-eastern Himalayan mountain chains. Policy-wise, this is how the US being over the horizon would like to see the “Indian democracy as a major defense partner” to function in tandem with the USA’s extended “Indo-Pacific-ness” on the mountains.

Balance
Even so, Henry Kissinger, titan of America’s international diplomacy in theory and practice, neither thinks the US present policy towards China is so simplistic nor he feels a confrontational view towards China is the order of the day (The Economist Podcast, 22 April 2021). In his view, the making of President Biden policy on strategic international affairs particularly in relation to China at this transitional phase of his presidency is impacted by the compulsion of governance legacy he has inherited from his predecessor, President Donald Trump. Balancing the internal compulsion of legacy with policy moves on strategic international affairs is a challenge President Biden faces to resolve into new policy equilibrium on China.
After deeply feeling the several great depressive security, economic, political and health happenings, the USA has experienced in the first 20 years of the 21st century, the world now certainly is able to better appreciate and understand it in terms of its relative internal governance compulsions and external technological strengths. For President Biden, the core challenge is to balance the USA’s internal governance compulsions and external technological strengths. Here it may be enlightening to underline significance of the oriental indigenous science of ayurveda. The core merit of ayurveda lies in its ability to have a balanced view of the bodily system to the extent that it can treat it in a way where the ayurvedic products in substance and quantum deliver the optimum efficacy in matra (equilibrium) with the bodily system. The world sure likes to have PRC-US ties on matra.

(Dr. Upendra Gautam is secretary general of China Study Center Nepal)